European Law Review - 2011
Case Comment:-
Determining refugee
status under Directive 2004/83: comment on Bolbol (C-31/
Author:
Paul
James Cardwell -
Senior
Lecturer, School of Law
E.L.
Rev. 2011, 36(1), 135-145
Subject:
Immigration.
Other related subjects: European Union. International
law
Legislation:
Directive 2004/83 on the minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals and
stateless persons as refugees Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees 1951 (United Nations) art.1D
Case:
Bolbol
v Bevandorlasi es Allampolgarsagi Hivatal (C-31/09)
Unreported June 17, 2010 (ECJ)
*E.L. Rev. 135
Abstract
In
Bolbol, the European Court of Justice considered the
refusal of the Hungarian authorities to grant refugee
status to a stateless Palestinian. Her claim relied on a
provision of the Geneva Convention contained in
Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third-country nationals as
refugees. The ECJ was willing to consider that the
minimum standards extended to considering the
eligibility of a Palestinian displaced after 1951 as a
refugee, but that the individual in question must have
actually, not potentially, availed themselves of UN
protection or assistance. The Court interpreted a
vaguely worded provision of the Geneva Convention in a
narrow way, though it rejected the even narrower
approaches put forward by some Member States. In this
article, the author discusses the balancing act
undertaken by the ECJ when considering minimum standards
legislation in a dynamic and rapidly evolving domain of
EU law-making.
Introduction
The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) had two occasions in the
first half of 2010 to rule on provisions of EU law
relating to Palestine and the Palestinians. In
Brita,
1 the Court ruled that goods originating from
the occupied West Bank are not entitled to enter the
European Union under the preferential terms allowed by
the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The case discussed
here, Bolbol,
2 relates not to goods but to people and the
specific situation of displaced Palestinians. The case
concerns the extent to which decisions on refugee status
are affected by EU law in addition to domestic and
international law. As an area in which an evolving body
of EU law sits between well-established (though not
always fully defined) provisions of international law
and domestic interpretations, further complications
arise in relation to the unique legal position of
displaced Palestinians.
In
this article, the author first considers the legal basis
and development of the EU-wide provisions on refugees
and asylum seekers and the workings of Directive
2004/83.3 The article then examines the
dispute between Ms Bolbol and the Hungarian authorities
which resulted in the preliminary reference procedure
being engaged; the Opinion of the Advocate General; and
the reasoning of the ECJ in reaching its decision. This
article concludes by considering two aspects arising
from the decision: the meaning of art.1D of the Geneva
Convention insofar as it concerns displaced
Palestinians, and the way in which the Court enforces
*E.L. Rev. 136 the
minimum standards provisions in an evolving and
uncertain legal environment. The article contends that
the Bolbol
decision is to be welcomed for its clarity, in that it
gives some indication as to how the Court will interpret
provisions originating in international legal sources,
but that Member States are likely to seek to “race to
the bottom” rather than use the minimum standards in the
Directive as a springboard to higher protection for
refugees and asylum seekers.
Legal
framework
The
Bolbol
case arose against the background of a growing set of
instruments at EU level dealing with legal issues
relating to refugees and asylum seekers, which had
largely been beyond the scope of EU law.4 The
Treaty of Amsterdam had considerably strengthened the
competences of the EU institutions under the EC Treaty
to harmonise aspects of migration law. The Treaty also
obliged the Council to adopt measures on asylum, in
accordance with the Geneva Convention of July 28, 1951,
within five years from the date of entry into force of
the Treaty.5 Following Amsterdam, the
European Council's Tampere Conclusions in October 1999
served as a guide to the “milestones” to be created
towards a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice.6
The Tampere Conclusions stated the aim of creating a
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to include clear
and uniform rules and standards on procedures, and
recognition and reception of asylum seekers.7
Subsequent directives built on these conclusions and
also on pre-existing measures, in particular the Dublin
Convention (1990) which created a framework to designate
the Member State responsible for dealing with individual
asylum applications.8 Other measures covered
minimum reception conditions for asylum seekers,9
the responsibility of the Member States for considering
an application for asylum, minimum standards of
procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing
refugee status,10 and a directive covering
the situation of a mass influx of persons from a
specific geographical area.11
Directive 2004/83 establishes minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third-country nationals or
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection, and the content
of that protection. The Directive shares with the other
CEAS measures the emphasis on minimum standards to be
adopted rather than full harmonisation.12 As
such, art.3 states that Member States,
“may introduce or retain favourable standards for
determining who qualifies as a refugee or as a person
eligible for subsidiary protection … in so far as those
standards are compatible with this Directive.”
The
case here concerns the interpretation of this Directive,
in particular art.12(1)(a), which deals with exclusion
from the category of refugees or stateless persons under
international law. At the heart of
*E.L. Rev. 137
international refugee law is the Geneva Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951 as
supplemented by the New York Protocol of January 31,
1967. The underlying principle of the Geneva Convention
is that of non-refoulement
and the assurance by signatories that nobody is sent
back to a country where they face persecution. All
Member States of the European Union have signed and
ratified the Convention.
The
Bolbol
case
The
Bolbol
case explores the right to be recognised as a refugee
under the Geneva Convention, and hence under the
Directive. However, refugee status in this case also
turned on the unique situation of Palestine and
Palestinian refugees, who are the subject of the only UN
agency specifically tasked with dealing with refugees
from one geographical location. Nawras Bolbol, a
stateless Palestinian, arrived in Hungary in January
2007 and was granted a residence permit by the Hungarian
authorities. She then applied for refugee status in
order to ensure that, in the event that her permit was
not extended, she would not be returned to the Gaza
Strip. Her application under art.1D of the Geneva
Convention as a Palestinian resident outside the zone
under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) was rejected by
the Immigration and
Citizenship Office (Bevándorlási és állampolgársági
Hivatal--the BAH). Ms Bolbol challenged this rejection
in the Budapest Metropolitan Court (Fövárosi Bíróság)
which stayed proceedings and referred three questions to
the ECJ: first, for the purposes of art.12(1)(a) of the
Directive, must someone be regarded as receiving UN
protection and assistance merely by virtue of being
entitled to receive it? Secondly, does cessation of the
protection or assistance mean residence outside the
agency's area of operations or an objective obstacle
such that the person entitled thereto is unable to avail
himself of that protection or assistance? Thirdly, do
the benefits of this Directive mean automatic
recognition as a refugee, or merely inclusion in the
scope ratione
personae of the Directive?
Ms
Bolbol based her claim for refugee status on the second
subparagraph of art.1D of the Geneva Convention. The
full article provides that:
“This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at
present receiving from organs or agencies of the United
Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees protection or assistance.
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any
reason, without the position of such persons being
definitely settled in accordance with the relevant
restitutions adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, these persons shall
ipso facto
be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.”
Ms
Bolbol claimed that she fell within the scope of this
paragraph since she was entitled to the protection or
assistance of UNRWA, based on a family connection. It
was not disputed in the case, however, that she had not
actually availed herself of the protection or assistance of
UNRWA. Her claim was therefore based on the
entitlement to protection or assistance. The BAH disputed
her claim to be eligible for protection and UNRWA had
not been able to confirm her right to be registered on
the basis of her family connections. It rejected her
application, although she was placed under the
protection of non-refoulement,
meaning that she could not be returned to Palestine.
Before the domestic court and the ECJ, Ms Bolbol argued
that the second paragraph of art.1D is a separate basis
for recognition as a refugee from the “general” art.1 of
the Geneva Convention, and that since she was outside of
UNRWA's area of operation (and cannot be expected to
return) then refugee status must
automatically
be granted. As the defendant in the proceedings, the BAH
contended that recognition is not automatic but must be
assessed on a case-by-case approach. In order to qualify
under the second paragraph of art.1D, Ms Bolbol would
have had to have left Palestine under the conditions set
out in art.1A (“owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion”). For the BAH, the second paragraph of
*E.L. Rev. 138 art.1D
merely establishes the scope of the Directive
ratione personae
and does not automatically grant a basis for refugee
status.
The
Opinion of the Advocate General
In
A.G. Sharpston's Opinion,13 Ms Bolbol's
argument that her mere entitlement to protection or
assistance brought her within the scope of the Geneva
Convention art.1D (and hence art.12(1)(a) of the
Directive) was not considered to be well founded.
The
Advocate General relied on both the establishing
statutes and persuasive statements from the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
on the interpretation of the relevant Geneva Convention14
and noted the absence of a ruling by the International
Court of Justice on art.1D. She found that the UNHCR
handbook covers exceptions for Palestinians unable to
avail themselves of the assistance of UNRWA under
art.1D, the normal characteristic of which should be
that conditions which originally qualified the
individual for protection or assistance still apply and
that cessation and exclusion clauses do not apply.15
UNRWA guidance notes dating from 2002 and 2009 on
Palestinians leaving the territory treated the first
sentence of art.1D as alternative, rather than
cumulative, and stated that “receiving … protection or
assistance” can be regarded as “being entitled to
receive”. The 2009 note, issued by UNHCR in the context
of the preliminary reference from the Hungarian court to
the ECJ, suggests that persons previously registered who
travel outside the UNRWA zone are within the notion of
protection which has “ceased for any reason”.16
The
Advocate General considered that being outside the
geographical zone could allow an individual to invoke
the second sentence of art.1D but that the consecutive
nature of the provision means that it should first be
ascertained whether their situation came within the
first sentence. If not, then the individual may still
apply for individual assessment under art.1A. The
Advocate General rejected as too rigid a submission by
the United Kingdom that “at present” in art.1D refers
only to the time of drafting, i.e. 1951. However, she
also dismissed Ms Bolbol's argument that anyone who has
ever received assistance from UNRWA falls within the
first sentence of art.1D as being too broad a position.
Coming to the view that a time limitation is necessary,
her view was that the phrase “at present receiving”
within art.1D means “persons who are currently receiving
protection or assistance from UN organs or agencies
other than the UNHCR”.17
The
Advocate General did agree with the submission by the UK
Government18 that “receiving” is not the same
as “is entitled to receive” and was minded to follow the
clear (and unamended for 50 years) text of the first
sentence of art.1D, in contrast to the UNHCR's own
interpretation, finding that a strict interpretation was
necessary.19 She also rejected Ms Bolbol's
submission that the scope of the second sentence of
art.1D covered all
those excluded from the first sentence. Rather, she
found that the key lies in whether the individual has
voluntarily
removed themselves from the geographical area of
operation of UNRWA.20 The individuals caught
by the second sentence of art.1D would be those affected
by UNRWA ceasing its activities, not those who had
departed voluntarily. Finally, the Advocate General
opined that “ipso
facto … entitled to the benefits of this
convention” meant automatic grant of refugee status,
rather *E.L. Rev. 139
than (as suggested by the United Kingdom and Belgium)
merely the entitlement to be assessed under art.1A.21
Applying mutatis mutandis her interpretation to
art.12(1)(a), she recognised that the meanings are
identical, but acknowledged:
“Both the State's legitimate interest in checking
whether a particular individual is entitled to what he
claims and the very real, practical problems that any
displaced person seeking refugee status may face in
proving his entitlement.”22
Registration with UNRWA is “a matter of evidence, not of
substance” though full UNRWA registration may not be
necessary.23 She gave substantially the same
response on evidence to the second question, in that
cessation of protection or assistance must not be by an
individual's own volition.24
On
the third question, the Advocate General found that by
considering the scheme of the Directive more globally,
as transposing obligations under international law, the
“benefits of this Directive” are taken to mean
qualification as a refugee and automatic entitlement to
refugee status.25 Such an interpretation
avoids the risk of an individual fulfilling both parts
of art.12(1)(a) but nevertheless failing to be
classified as a refugee.
The
judgment of the Court of Justice
The
judgment is much briefer than the Opinion, though it
arrived at the same conclusion following a similar
reasoning, at least as far as the first referred
question is concerned. The Court ruled that for the
purposes of the first sentence of art.12(1)(a) of the
Directive,
“A
person receives protection or assistance from an agency
of the United Nations other than UNHCR, when that person
has actually
availed himself of that protection or assistance.”26
(Emphasis added.)
Since this responded to the first question referred, the
Court did not find it necessary to offer responses to
the second and third questions.27
The
Court arrived at its decision by referring to the legal
context--at the international level, this included
selected United Nations General Assembly Resolutions
from 1949,28 196729 and 2008.30
The latter extended the mandate of UNRWA, noting the
importance of its “unimpeded operation”.31
The Court did not, in contrast to the Advocate General,
make use of the non-binding statements from the UNHCR or
its handbook in its initial outline of the relevant
legal context, noting later in its judgment that the
2002 note “fails to provide sufficiently clear and
unequivocal guidance to guarantee consistent application
of that provision [art.1D] with regard to Palestinians”.32
The Court also pointed to other provisions in the
Directive, including respect for fundamental rights and
compliance with the Geneva Convention. The Court noted
the national *E.L. Rev. 140
legal provisions in force in Hungary (all enacted prior
to the entry into force of the Directive) but, following
the Opinion,33 found that the non-transposed
Directive could be relied on directly.34
The
Court observed that the Directive must be interpreted in
the light of “its general scheme and purpose”,35
and that its purpose is to set minimum standards with
respect to the Geneva Convention as the “cornerstone of
the international legal regime for the protection of
refugees”.36 These observations are in fact a
recital of the words used in the case of
Salahadin Abdulla, 37 which related to the same
Directive, albeit on the conditions under which
classification as a refugee may cease which were not
directly relevant.
The
Court dealt with the first question in relatively few
paragraphs. It pointed to the Advocate General's
observations on UNRWA's registration instructions that
Palestinian refugees can be those displaced after 1967,
and recognised that someone in Bolbol's position cannot
be ruled out of the scope of art.1D.38 The
Court explicitly rejected the UK Government's argument
to the contrary.39 Nevertheless, the Court
found that art.1D is sufficiently clear when it refers
to persons “at present receiving” protection or
assistance from an organ or agency of the UN other than
the UNHCR. On this basis, the Court decided that the
clear wording pointed to a narrow interpretation of
art.1D and only those who have
actually
availed themselves of protection or assistance fall
within the scope of the clause.40 However,
full UNRWA registration appears not to be required by
the ECJ, which opened the door to “evidence of that
assistance by other means”.41 The Court also
pointed to an alternative course of action for those in
Ms Bolbol's situation who have not actually availed
themselves of protection (or who cannot provide
satisfactory evidence) by highlighting that they may be
considered for refugee status under the more general
art.2(c) of the Directive.42
Analysis
This section focuses on two related issues raised by the
Bolbol
judgment. The first is the specific context of art.1D,
which was clearly written with the situation of
Palestinians in mind. The second is the light the
decision sheds on the notion of minimum qualification
standards under the Directive.
Article 1D in context
As
the Advocate General noted in her Opinion, the meaning
and construction of art.1D contained at least four areas
of “opacity”.43 The provision gives little
clue as to either the geographical boundaries or
time-limit for persons receiving protection or
assistance; the difference between actual protection and
entitlement, as well as the nature of UNRWA
registration; the circumstances which amount to a
cessation of protection or assistance; or the meaning of
“these persons shall
ipso facto
be entitled to the benefits of this Convention”.44
One
means of resolving these issues is to consider the
overall purpose of art.1D in its historical and
contemporary context. For the Advocate General,
consideration must be given to the need to avoid any
*E.L. Rev. 141 denial of
protection and assistance for genuine refugees.45
To do otherwise, it is implied, would be to undermine
the EU's values,46 as well as Treaty based
commitments to upholding human rights47 and
to the “strict observance” of international law.48
Furthermore, art.1D was drafted to give special
consideration to displaced Palestinians and must be read
in the light of the continued “unhappy reality” of
displaced Palestinians at the present time and not just
before 1951.49 However, the specificity of
their situation does not mean that Palestinians, whether
or not actually having had protection or assistance from
UNRWA, have an automatic right to refugee status
elsewhere. The Advocate General also put forward her
view that since the second sentence of art.1D was
intended to supplement the first, they should be read
“consecutively, not disjunctively”; but the provision
should be read as a whole to find a “reasonable balance
between caring for displaced Palestinians (under art.1D)
and caring for other potential refugees (under the 1951
Convention as a whole)”.50
Although the exclusion from having the status of a
refugee in art.1D of the Geneva Convention was framed in
general terms, the
travaux préparatoires
of the Geneva Conference in 1951 clearly show that the
Palestinian situation was at the forefront of the minds
of the drafters.51 That the Advocate General
and the Court considered that the words “at present” in
the text of the Convention applies to displaced
Palestinians not only at the time of the drafting of the
Convention but afterwards too is unsurprising. The
continued existence of UNRWA (by a mandate renewed every
three years) is evidence that a restrictive reading is
incompatible with the continued mission to aid displaced
persons. Again, this would seem to be particularly acute
due to the unique situation of displaced Palestinians,
most of whom do not have residence, social or civil
rights elsewhere. Their situation differs, legally and
factually, from other examples of displaced persons such
as Greek-Cypriots in the period following 1974.52
It
would thus have been unusual to recognise the
continuously renewed mandate of UNRWA and yet to find,
as the UK Government submitted to the Court, that only
Palestinians affected by displacement in 1951 would be
covered. Case law in the United Kingdom provides an
interesting comparator since, in the case of
El-Ali and Daraz v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
53 the Court of Appeal had also considered
the case of a Palestinian who had received protection
from UNRWA before claiming refugee status in the United
Kingdom. In that case, Laws L.J. responded to the
assertion that art.1D had a continued effect by stating
that:
“Under the suggested interpretation, ‘at present’ does
not refer to a specific date (28 July 1951 or otherwise)
as setting the time when the membership of the class
described in the first sentence is fixed (which is
surely the ordinary sense of the words used) but merely
to a start-date, a
terminus a quo,
for the identification of the class whose membership
may, however, be swelled by new entrants thereafter. I
think this is a very considerable distortion of the
Article's language.”54
*E.L.
Rev. 142
Laws L.J. also referred to one of the only other cases
on interpretation of art.1D, which also happened to
concern an EU Member State--Germany. In a case from
1991,55 the German Federal Administrative
Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) accepted that “at
present” referred to 1951 but that this did not exclude
the class of persons enjoying protection or assistance
after that date. The German court did, however, state
that those who left UNRWA's zones voluntarily should not
have the option to benefit automatically from the
Convention.
The
consequences of different interpretations of art.1D stem
from the vagueness of the provisions. In
Bolbol,
the extent to which the Advocate General and the Court
relied to greater or lesser extents on the non-binding
legal documents used by the UNHCR demonstrates that the
terms of this provision can be read in different ways.
Certainly, as Lambert correctly noted in 2006,56
the ambit of art.1D as set out in art.12(1)(a) of the
Directive is wider than the UK courts had envisaged. NGO
research on the status of Palestinian refugees in EU
countries (prior to the entry into force of the
Directive) reveals substantial disparities in the
interpretation of art.1D.57 Of course, the
nature of the Directive allows Member States the right
to adopt more favourable treatment, but not the reverse.
The decision in
Bolbol will therefore have an impact on the
interpretation of this provision by the Member States.
Nevertheless, both the Advocate General and the ECJ were
careful to avoid extending the scope of the provision
and it could be seen that the interpretation chosen
(i.e. individuals actually having availed themselves of
assistance or protection) falls short of UNHCR's
interpretation of the section. This can be seen from
UNHCR's interpretation of art.1D, which,
“is
not based on that Article's literal meaning, but takes
into account the general principle of international law
that a treaty should be interpreted in accordance with
the rules of interpretation codified in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, as acknowledged by
the ECJ. Thus, in addition to the text and ordinary
meaning of the terms included in Article 1D, the object
and purpose of the 1951 Convention, as well as its
overall historical objective and context in which it was
drafted and developments subsequent to its conclusion
will be relevant ….”58
For
UNHCR, developments since 1967 can result in individuals
being caught by art.1D and the 2009 note does not
specify a need, in UNHCR's view, for a person to be
fully registered with UNRWA to benefit but simply to be
“inside UNRWAs area of operations”.59 In its
revised statement considering the questions referred by
the Hungarian court, insisting on registration (or at
least something close to it) as proof of entitlement is
“not conclusive as to whether he or she falls within
that Article's scope”.60 UNRWA does not
automatically provide help or assistance to everyone
with the areas in which it operates. As such, UNHCR
considers that the provision applies to those not
covered by arts 1C, 1E or 1F of the Convention who are
inside the area of operations of UNRWA. “At present
receiving” means a category of persons defined by
geographical reach, rather than whether the individual
concerned is personally eligible. Similarly, since UNRWA
continues to provide protection and assistance in its
areas of operation, the “ceased”
*E.L. Rev. 143 dimension can only refer to
situations other than those envisaged when the provision
was drafted (i.e. that UNRWA would essentially be a
temporary entity). “For any reason” suggests including
cases where the Palestinian has left that area, with no
indication as to whether this was voluntary or caused by
a well-founded fear of persecution.61
Within this context, the ECJ strikes a balance between
the restrictive view of art.1D taken by some Member
States and the wider view of UNHCR. Following this
decision, for the purposes of the Directive, an
individual must have actually availed themselves of
protection or assistance from UNRWA. Of course, art.1D
applies only to the “exceptionalism” of the Palestinian
case,62 rather than the more general
definitions or categories covered by the Geneva
Convention and, therefore, the Directive. As the Court
points out, reading the Directive in this way does not
prevent individuals such as Ms Bolbol from applying for
refugee status pursuant to art.1A, although this would
require proof of a “well founded fear” rather than
automatic entitlement.
Applying minimum qualification standards
The
ECJ's interpretation of the text is to be welcomed for
its clarity, and was no doubt greatly aided by the
Advocate General's comprehensive classification of the
five potential outcomes of reading the provisions in
different ways.63 As a means by which the
Common European Asylum System is to be put in place, the
judgment in Bolbol
demonstrates the Court's willingness to ensure that
minimum harmonisation measures are just that. In a
sense, the judgment provides some indication of how the
Court may act in interpreting the Directive when it
relies directly on a source of international law. One
might also refer to the words of Judge Lenaerts
(extra-judicially) on asylum, that the ECJ “now enjoys
jurisdiction to answer questions referred by inferior
courts, which will certainly contribute to improving the
dialogue between the judiciary at national and EU
level”.64 It is notable that neither the
Advocate General nor the Court had the opportunity to
refer to previous cases in this area--however, two
joined cases relating to the interpretation of the
Directive are (at the time of writing) pending before
the Court65 and it is likely that the ECJ is
going to face an increasing number of delicate questions
relating to the post-Tampere Directives.
The
Commission, in a review of the application of the
Directive (published at the same time as the
Bolbol
judgment was delivered) notes numerous difficulties in
applying minimum harmonisation measures in the Member
States. Although conceptually, minimum harmonisation
measures work as a potential means to move towards an
eventual greater degree of uniformity between the Member
States, the introduction of an additional legal source
in between international and domestic law may have
unintended consequences in terms of practical
application. Furthermore, as Gil-Bazo has noted, the
minimum standards Directives were agreed in the era of
post-September 11 security anxiety. Member States were
keen to ensure that
refoulement could be an option for “security” reasons as an
exception to the general rule of
non-refoulement.
The Directive prevents
refoulement
when prohibited by international law, but if the limits
of the prohibition are uncertain, then it would fall to
the ECJ to decide on the limits. Uncertainty in
international law, coupled with another level of
uncertainty in EU law could potentially allow Member
States to remove individuals in breach of international
law. It would be difficult, in the absence of further
definition, for the ECJ to find
refoulement
for security reasons to be contrary to EU law unless it
found *E.L. Rev. 144 that
a Member State was acting contrary to fundamental
rights.66 In this respect, the danger
inherent in minimum standards harmonisation is that
Member States may seek to take advantage of ambiguously
worded provisions: according to Costello, governments
have consistently made “crude and repeated alterations
to asylum processes across Europe over the past two
decades, as [their] primary response to the ‘asylum
crisis”’.67 The submissions by some Member
States in Bolbol
suggest that if the Court wishes to ensure the effective
workings of the CEAS, it may need to be assertive in
diverting from what (some) Member States contend to be
the proper interpretations of sources of international
law. In support of this potential course of action, one
might recall here the Opinion of the Advocate General in
Kadi that “it would be wrong to conclude that, once the
Community is bound by a rule of international law, the
Community Courts must bow to that rule with complete
acquiescence and apply it unconditionally in the
Community legal order”68 and the subsequent
judgment by the Court in the same case, which recalled
the nature of the European Union as “an autonomous legal
system which is not to be prejudiced by an international
agreement”.69
A
proposal made by the Commission in 2009 for a recasting
of the Directive70 to achieve higher
standards of protection across the European Union does
not include proposed changes to art.12, though it does
cover significant changes to the wording of most other
provisions in a move designed “to take further steps
towards a uniform status”.71 In a separate
document assessing the impact of another Directive on
minimum standards,72 the Commission laments
the different levels of procedural standards across the
Member States and contends that there is a risk of a
“race to the bottom”, continuing,
“since those Member States currently providing more
generous protection standards may be inclined to lower
their standards in order to avoid ‘attracting’ larger
numbers of asylum seekers.”73
The
Commission also notes that:
“The asylum acquis and corresponding national measures
appear to be an increasingly complex system of law in
which both the accessibility of substantive rights and
the procedural consequences largely depend on the
applicant's individual acts.”74
Using this as a justification for higher standards at EU
level would succeed in greater harmonisation--but also
recognises the reasoning why Member States may resist
it. The interventions of certain Member States in
Bolbol demonstrate the often restrictive way in which
international (as well as EU) legal provisions are
preferred to be seen by Member State governments
conscious of domestic political sensitivities around
asylum and immigration.
Whether the proposed recasting of the Directive succeeds
or not, it is highly *E.L. Rev.
145 likely that the Court will be called on to
decide similar cases in the near future relating to this
important, yet still nascent, aspect of the European
integration project.
Conclusion
The
Bolbol
decision is likely to be one of an increasing number of
cases brought before the ECJ as the European Union moves
towards consolidating the CEAS. In
Bolbol,
the issue at stake was on the one hand rather specific
as it concerned the unique situation of the displaced
Palestinians under international law. The judgment
turned on the interpretation of a specific provision of
the Geneva Convention, which is directed at the
Palestinians without mentioning them by name. In this
regard, the ECJ gives a clear and lucid interpretation
of the provision by bearing in mind the likely impact on
the individual concerned. On the other hand, the Court's
decision can be seen more generally as achieving a
balancing act between the interests of the Member States
and the limited nature of minimum harmonisation measures
in a way which could be used in the future as a basis
for interpretation of provisions stemming from sources
of international law--whether relating to migration or
not.
1.
Brita
GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen (C-398/06) February
25, 2010. For comment, see P.J. Cardwell, “Adjudicating
on the origin of products from Israel and the West Bank:
Brita” (2011) 17 E. P. L. 37 and G. Harpaz and E.
Rubinson, “The interface between trade, law and politics
and the erosion of normative power Europe: comment on
Brita” (2010) 34 E. L. Rev. 551.
2.
Nawras
Bolbol v Bevándorlási és állampolgársági Hivatal
(C-31/09) June 17, 2010.
3.
Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third-country nationals or
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection and the content
of the protection guaranteed [2004] OJ L304/13.
4.
The
only reference to refugees pre-1999 was found in
Regulation 1408/71 (Social Security Regulation) art.1(d)
[1971] OJ L149/2: E. Guild, “The Europeanisation of
Europe's Asylum Policy” (2006) 18 International Journal
of Refugee Law 631. Co-ordination between Member States
to prevent multiple asylum applications had, however,
been discussed in the Council as early as the 1980s: E
Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.196.
5.
Article 63 EC (now 78 TFEU).
6.
European Council, “Presidency Conclusions” (Tampere:
1999), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm
[Accessed December 16, 2010].
7.
European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, 1999,
para.13.
8.
The
Dublin Convention was later transformed into Regulation
343/2003 (Dublin II Regulation) [2003] OJ L50/1.
9.
Directive 2003/9 [2003] OJ L31/18.
10.
Directive 2005/85 [2005] OJ L326/13.
11.
Directive 2001/55 [2001] OJ L212/12.
12.
Formerly art.63 EC, as amended by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. The parts of the provision relating to
minimum standards (art.63(1) and (2)) were repealed by
the amended TFEU. Article 63(3) and (4) EC are now found
in art.79 TFEU, which does not refer to minimum
standards.
13.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston March 4, 2010.
14.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [9]-[20], [37].
15.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [17].
16.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [20].
17.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [70].
18.
The
United Kingdom had “opted in” to Directive 2004/83 as
per arts 1 and 3 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the TEU and EC
Treaty.
19.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [73]-[74].
20.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [81].
21.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [89].
22.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [95].
23.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [97]-[99]. France
had submitted that only full proof of registration with
UNRWA would suffice, which was rejected by the Advocate
General.
24.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [100]-[102].
25.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [109].
26.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [57].
27.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [56].
28.
UNGA
Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949.
29.
UNGA
Resolution 2252 (ES-V) of July 4, 1967.
30.
UNGA
Resolution 63/91 of December 5, 2008.
31.
UNGA
Resolution 63/91 of December 5, 2008, para.3.
32.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [34].
33.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [29].
34.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [33].
35.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [36].
36.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [37].
37.
Aydin
Salahadin Abdulla v Germany (C-175/08), Kamil Hasan v
Germany (C-176/08); Ahmed Adem and Hamrin Mosa Rashi v
Germany (C-178/08); Dler Jamal v Germany (C-179/08)
March 2, 2010.
38.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [46].
39.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [47].
40.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [51].
41.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) at [52].
42.
Article 2(c) reproduces the definition of a “refugee”
pursuant to art.1A of the Geneva Convention.
43.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [46].
44.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [47].
45.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [49].
46.
Now
found in art.2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
These values are common to the Member States in a
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.”
47.
Article 6 TEU.
48.
Article 3(5) TEU.
49.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [51].
50.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [56].
51.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [42]-[44].
52.
P.
Loizos and T. Kelly, “The Refugee Factor in Two
Protracted Conflicts: Cyprus and Palestine Compared” in
Dawn Chatty and Bill Finlayson (eds), Dispossession and
Displacement: Forced Migration in the Middle East and
North Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
p.233.
53.
El-Ali
and Daraz v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2002] EWCA Civ 1103; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 95.
54.
El-Ali
and Daraz [2003] 1 W.L.R. 95 at [33].
55.
Decision of June 4, 1991 (Bverg I C 42.88) (1992) 4(3)
I.J.R.L. 387 Case 1200.
56.
H.
Lambert, “The EU Asylum Qualification Directive, its
Impact on the Jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and
International Law” (2006) 55 I.C.L.Q. 161, 171.
57.
E.
Sondergaard, “Protection of Palestinian Refugees in
States Signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and
1954 Stateless Convention” (2004) 22 Al Majdal 27,
available at http://www.badil.org/en/al-majdal/itemlist/category/29-issue22
[Accessed December 16, 2010]. On asylum claims more
generally, see France Terre d'Asile, “La protection
subsidiaire: une mosaïque des droits” (2008) Cahier du
social No.18, available at http://www.france-terre-asile.org/images/stories/publications/cahiersdusocial/cs18_bon_de_commande.pdf
[Accessed November 4, 2010].
58.
UNHCR
Revised Statement on Article 1D of the 1951 Convention
(2009), p. 6.
59.
UNHCR
Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to
Palestinian Refugees (2009), p.3.
60.
UNHCR
Revised Statement on Article 1D of the 1951 Convention
(2009), p.7, fn.33.
61.
UNHCR
Revised Statement on Article 1D of the 1951 Convention
(2009), pp.7-8.
62.
For
more on the evolving nature of Palestinian
exceptionalism, see M. Kagan, “The (Relative) Decline of
Palestinian Exceptionalism and its Consequences for
Refugee Studies in the Middle East” (2010) 22 Journal of
Refugee Studies 417.
63.
Bolbol
(C-31/09) Opinion of A.G. Sharpston at [90].
64.
K.
Lenaerts, “The Contribution of the European Court of
Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”
(2010) 59 I.C.L.Q. 255, 291.
65.
Germany v B (C-57/09) and D (C-101/09) Opinion of A.G.
Mengozzi June 1, 2010.
66.
M.-T.
Gil-Bazo, “Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection
under EC Law: The Qualification Directive and the Right
to Be Granted Asylum” in Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth
Guild and Helen Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, Security and
Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy
(Oxford: Hart, 2007), p.255.
67.
C.
Costello, “The Asylum Process Directive in Legal
Context: Equivocal Standards Meet General Principles” in
Whose Freedom, Security and Justice?, 2007, pp.153-154.
68.
Yassin
Abdullah Kadi Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council of the European Union and European Commission
(C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) Opinion of A.G. Poiares
Maduro January 18, 2008 at [24].
69.
Yassin
Abdullah Kadi (C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) [2008] E.C.R.
I-6351 at [316].
70.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals or
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international
protection and the content of the protection granted
COM(2009) 551 final.
71.
Proposal for Qualification Directive COM(2009) 551,
p.10.
72.
Commission, Staff Working Document accompanying the
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the council on minimum standards on procedures in
Member States for granting and withdrawing international
protection SEC(2009) 1376 final.
73.
Staff
Working Document SEC(2009) 1376, pp.23-24.
74.
Staff
Working Document SEC(2009) 1376, p.41. |